If you haven’t yet seen the zone’s geography, here it is to the left, complete with its overlap with the Korean and Japanese zones. The most important conflict of course is over Senkaku, but Korea watchers will also note that the Ieodo submerged reef, which Korea claims, is also in the zone. Gotta wonder what the Chinese were thinking by giving Korea and Japan common cause over anything. Foolish.
Dan Drezner asked the question I think pretty much everyone is wondering now: did the PRC really expect the US, Japan, and SK to just accept this out of the blue? Obviously they’re not, and it’s hard to find anyone besides the Fox News of Asia Global Times who thinks they should.
I got called about this by my friend Sam Kim at Bloomberg. Needless to say, all my comments didn’t make into the story, so here is an edit of my email comments with Sam on why the Chinese seemed to just do this out of the blue.
SK/BB: Why are the Chinese doing this?
Me: “I see 4 possible explanations (each is roughly tied to a level of analysis in international relations theory):
1. Belligerence (anarchy, straight-up realism): the Chinese really are picking a fight with Japan. This is the worst possible reason. They may figure that the Hagel visit to Japan a couple months ago has made Japan into an open challenger to China now. And that is kinda true. America is hedging China, ducking and weaving, trying hard to avoid an open confrontation with it. But Japan is increasingly unabashed that is it balancing China directly as a threat. Abe is increasingly willing to call out China openly. So Asia is becoming a serious bipolar contest, and maybe the Chinese are thinking: ‘to hell with it; Abe’s playing tough; we have too also.’ Certainly my Japanese colleagues in this area increasingly talk about China this way.
2. Blowback (domestic politics, ‘myths of empire’): the CCP is doing this for domestic legitimacy purposes. CCP ideology since Tiananmen is nationalism, not communism. And Japan is the great foreign enemy in that narrative. The CCP may not want a conflict with Japan, but it’s been telling Chinese youth for 20+ years that Japan is greatly responsible for the ‘100 years of humiliation.’ So now the CCP is stuck; they have to be tough on Japan – even if they don’t want to be – because their citizens demand it. The CCP has created an anti-Japanese frankenstein at home that has to be placated. They have to ride the anti-Japanese tiger their education/propaganda has created, or risk a domestic backlash.
3. Incompetence (bureaucratic politics): the CCP and PLA didn’t really realize just how sharply locals and the US would react. Maybe they’re reading too many of these books claiming that China is about to ‘eclipse’ the US and ‘rule the world’ and all that. lol. Maybe they’re starting to believe their own hype and got overconfident. Chinese bullying in the SCS has worked out reasonably well so far, so maybe they felt they were on a roll and could do the same in the ECS. But China’s NEA neighbors are much more capable than in SEA.
4. The Transition (leadership, psychology): Xi Jinping wants to make a splash as the new boss. Our knowledge of CCP factions is weak (coastal Shanghai princelings vs hinterland populists is the usual breakdown, with Xi being from the Shanghai clique), but we know Xi was not a shoe-in. There was an internal contest, so Xi might be consolidating power with a flashy foreign crisis. Khrushchev did this sorta thing, and the NK leadership too frequently expresses internal splits by provoking foreign crises. There has been a lot of talk that Xi is consolidating foreign policy authority around himself through a new ‘national security council.’
The problem is that Chinese foreign policy decision-making is so opaque, that we have almost no idea which of these options is most accurate – or if it’s something else entirely. My guess is #2, because the Chinese have always struck me as pretty cautious, even crafty, in managing their rise. It’s true that they’re a lot more aggressive since 2009, but I don’t see them suddenly becoming reckless. The post-Mao oligarchy system that runs China is designed to avoid exactly that. And I always found that factoid that the PRC spends more on internal than external security to be indicative that CCP is, in fact, very insecure at the top. It’s gotta have an ideology with foreign enemies, otherwise the Chinese people might see the real enemy: the CCP’s corruption, rejection of democracy, and unwillingness to admit the horrors of Maoism.”
SK/BB: Is China’s Blowing the Opportunity of South Korean-Japanese Tension?
“I do think this will alienate South Korea, and it makes me wonder once again, as I said to Andrew last night, what is going on inside China. My sense has always been the PLA and CCP are much smarter than the Kremlin of Soviet days ever was. Sun Tzu said, “When your enemy is in the process of destroying himself, stay out of his way.” So if you’re China, just stay out of the way while SK and Japan tear at each other. But now, China has given cause for Japan, SK and the US to come together. Very foolish. And for what? Are the Chinese really go to force down or shoot down civilian airliners in the zone? That would be madness. It would alienate everyone in Asia, and China really needs local friends to avoid isolation by a coalition of the US, Japan, and India. I would imagine then that the US will play up this Chinese move to Japan and SK to suggest what US analysts have been saying for a long time – that Japan and Korea have a lot more in common than they admit and face much greater external threats than each other. Koreans take Ieodo pretty serious. They built that research facility on top of it and even made a monster movie about it. I don’t think China gets that, as throwing Ieodo and Senkaku in the zone together gave Japan and South Korea common cause overnight. And in fact, the Korean response on Ieodo was swift and entirely predictable. The Chinese need to hire some Korea experts, I think.”
SK/BB: Will This Escalate?
Me: “I am actually surprised the US challenged it so fast. The US has been hedging rising China for awhile now, but Japan is increasingly openly balancing against China. So I expected Japan, especially under Abe, to do something like this. But not the Americans. It makes me wonder who authorized that. Did it go all the way to POTUS? But challenging the zone early is a way to prevent it from sinking in. So from a brinksmanship perspective, it makes sense to respond immediately.
It is so hard to say if it will escalate. I will hazard a guesstimate and say no. China is still not capable of winning an air and/or maritime conflict in East Asia. Indeed, even without the US, I still think Japan would win a major skirmish around Senkaku. China is still mostly a land-power, while Japan has focused on air and sea power since WWII. Also, if China forces Japan’s hand, it will burn bridges throughout Asia and provoke an encircling coalition, possibly running from India all the way around up to Japan: . I don’t think Beijing is that foolish or the PLA that reckless. If I had to guess, this air-zone was declared, not to provoke a conflict with Japan, but to bolster the nationalist credentials of the CCP at home.
On the airlines, yes, I did hear that now they are not going to tell China anything after all. Wow. I wonder if the Chinese realized that they would be in a position where they might have to force down civilian airliners in order to back up their claim! Again, I just can’t imagine the PLA is that out of control. So my sense is, it’s a bluff and nothing will happen to those airliners. But if China were to repeat a KAL-007 resolution, it would vindicate Japan overnight and alienate Southeast Asian states, whom China needs to prevent encirclement, for years.”
The Chinese are the only people worse at Strategic Communication than the U.S.
Hah! Yeah, they really blew it on this one. The way it was introduced – just out the blue as some new requirement for the rest of us – all but demanded a brinksmanship response. And that’s what they got.
Tactically, China probably can do better this time. Strategically, it is brilliant and long due.
Although this situation does potentially offer common cause for Korea and Japan, are they actually taking it as such? Both reacted but are their responses in any way coordinated, I wonder. I doesn’t seem so.
A shame, too, this couldn’t encourage a stronger alliance or support for Taiwan, which remains the country, by far, most truly threatened.
To be fair to China, though, Japan’s original ADIZ looks almost as obnoxious and also includes Ieodo!
Kim Ki-young’s film Iodo (1977), by the way, is a horror film with probably one of the most shocking endings in the history of cinema.
Yeah, that’s a good point. They aren’t coordinating. But still, why would China distract Japan and SK from ripping at each other? Missed chance, no?
I was thinking of this: http://www.imdb.com/title/tt1934381/news. It wasn’t very good
From what we’ve read the the application of Japan’s ADIZ to Ieodo is in name only. There is an agreement, unspoken or not, that Korean flights around there will not be interfered with by Japan.
Then why is it in the zone? This is a silly comment on Mr. Dell’s part.
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This could also be a means of weakening the nationalist & militarist factions, ironically enough.
Give them all they seek and show the silly consequences of their ways.
It would be easier to sweep aside (or control) discredited groups.
I don’t doubt that more level-headed Chinese leaders know that they are powerless against the US now (even with new Chinese supercavitating torpedoes and ship killer cruise missiles).
If this thing really blows up in China’s face, this could be a potential embarrassment for the PLA, as this was their baby
The Chinese are playing the long game here. Yes, they are challenging the status quo now. But eventually the new ADIZ will become part of the new status quo. 20 years from now airlines will still be reporting in when passing through the zone and China will be citing that as evidence of its longstanding administration of the area.
I agree 100%. And an ADIZ is nice way to project influence without looking like you are projecting influence. They can just say, ‘all we’re asking for is to get a phone call before you fly through this airspace.’
From the news I am hearing so far, it seems like ROK-China’s honeymoon is over. China singlehandly improved ROK-Japan relations overnight. ROK is now also calling for better relations with Japan. I wonder whether these extra islands that China might get or not were worth it.
With some news over here:
My thoughts exactly. Driving Korea and Japan to common cause would seem like a herculean undertaking, yet the Chinese pulled it off.
I agree Taiwan has the most to lose and driving a wedge between Beijing and Taipei using the perceived annexation of the Senkaku Islands is brilliant foreign policy move for the US/Japan/ROK military alliance. How far can Xi Jin Ping and the Shanghai clique be pushed if they are really trying to embarrass knuckle dragging Neanderthals inside the nationalist ranks of the PLA? At what point do ultra-nationalists gain the upper hand in Beijing?
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China made a good strategic move and has the rights to do so. People will realize that and be more sensible and less over-reacting. It is baffling to see Japanese gov repeatedly asks China to withdraw its ADIZ while they had ADIZ 40 years ago and expanded it a few times covering the disputed Islands without negotiating with anybody including China.
Feels like I can kick your ass but you cannot fight back, or I will make a big buzz around the world and cry loud to my big daddy (USA). Quite overbearing and absurd.
Hah! Well said.
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