My October Diplomat Essay: Russia between Empire and Modernity


This is a re-up of an essay I just wrote for the Diplomat (posted here). And that image to the left comes from this famous (notorious, really) tweet. If that doesn’t capture the values clash between Putin and modernity – real men have tigers as pets, while Obama is a well-dressed wus – I don’t know what would. If you ever wondered where feminism in the study of international relations came from, there you go.

Russia is a bit outside my normal purview, but I’ve always had a running interest. I studied Russian in grad school and spent a few summers there learning the language. I enjoyed it a lot and like to think I am sympathetic. Like a lot of post-Soviet analysts, I find it tragic how badly misgoverned Russia has been for so long – literally back to Ivan the Terrible. Russia has so much human capital; if only it was governed properly, it could be a serious emerging market player like China. But instead its one megalomaniac czar after another – whether they be imperial, Soviet, or Putin – wrecking the economy for their own vanity and nationalist unwillingness to accommodate the West.

Putin would rather posture and bluster like a bully on the school parking lot than whip Russia into shape. Everyone knows what’s needed – real elections, press freedom, an anti-corruption campaign, and so on. But I guess if Western analysts say these things, the ‘Russian’ way for Putin must be to do the opposite. So we’re back to 19th century ‘Dostoyevskyan’ images of Russia as an Orthodox, anti-western nationalist power with a unique mission (read it for yourself, then compare it to Alexander Nevsky). That may sate the ideological cravings for global status of Russia’s nationalists, but it won’t help Russia rival the West in the medium-term, will scare non-Russians along Russia’s borders, especially Muslims, and will not impress Beijing, which long ago learned how to profit from globalization and capitalism (while corruption is destroying Russia).

Here’s that essay after the jump:


“Russian President Vladimir Putin’s annexation of the Crimea and the shadow war in Ukraine is the most important geopolitical event in Europe since the end of the Cold War. Putin is widely seen in the West now as gangster-like figure, obsessed with Cold War-era grudges, and unwilling to allow the ex-Soviet Union’s ‘near abroad’ to find their own post-Cold War path. Putin would seem to prefer the countries around him be failed states, whose weakness opens them to Russian manipulation, rather than modernizers, moving, however haltingly to democracy, non-corrupt capitalism, and association with Western governments and values. Were Russia’s immediate neighbors to move toward the European norm, as much of eastern Europe has since 1990, it would be harder for Russia to bully them, and that bullying would attract global attention.

This is not to suggest that Russia is a great enemy or threat to the West. Supporters of Mitt Romney have recently claimed justification for Romney’s 2012 statement that Russia is America’s ‘greatest geopolitical foe.’ This is not true. (If one must apply that needlessly belligerent moniker, it is probably either Islamic jihadism or North Korea, both of which are openly and aggressively anti-American.) Russia’s assets of national power are dramatically diminished since the Cold War. Its GDP today is just $2 trillion, where the combined GDP of the US and EU exceeds $35 trillion. Russia’s military suffers from corruption, morale issues due to harsh conscription treatment, and a general lack of funds to compete with high-tech US, European, and Chinese militaries. For this reason, Russia has emphasized nuclear weapons and deterrence in its doctrine. Like North Korea, Russian WMD (weapons of mass destruction) are a pillar of its claim to relevance. Russia under Putin may seek to be a spoiler along its western and southern tier (and in resolving North Korean issues), but the likelihood of a genuine western-Russian clash is low. That is not a conflict Russia can win in the medium-term, and in the long-term, a complete breach with the West would destabilize the Russian economy so much that it would endanger Putin’s position.

The more important question is ‘grand strategic’: will Russia choose ‘neo-imperial’ meddling along its frontier, an age-old Russian practice that, in turn, fosters czarist authoritarianism and corruption at home, and bad blood and resentment among its neighbors? Or will it embrace some form of modernity, as it partially tried in the 1990s, with reasonable governance at home, and some kind of modus vivendi, including respect for foreigner’s sovereignty, abroad? If it choose the former, as Putin has done, what is the end-game? Where does Putinism lead in ten or twenty years? Semi-permanent isolation from the West? Boundless corruption? Dependence on China?


To be sure, Russia today is not an empire in its classic sense. Instead, the post-Cold War Russian practice of keeping ‘near abroad’ conflicts indefinitely frozen destabilizes former Soviet satellites, prevents them from moving toward the West, and allows Russia to variously bribe or bully corrupt local elites. Putin is clearing channeling deep impulses from Russian history in his constant references to the ‘state’ (gosudarstvo) over society, his famous claim that the collapse of Soviet Union was the ‘greatest catastrophe of the twentieth century,’ and most recently his Crimea annexation speech, a full-on Russian nationalist-messianic mix of ethno-nationalism, Orthodoxy, and geopolitical resentment.

This language is deeply appealing to sentiments of resentment and prestige, especially Putin-style nostalgia for Russian ‘influence.’ For several centuries Russia has been a great power, and with that has the come an ‘arrogance of power,’ in which ‘spheres of influence’ are expected as matter of right or respect, where small states should ‘keep quiet.’ And certainly, the US, Japan, and EU states have all acted this way in the past as well.

But as President Obama has noted repeatedly, these are twentieth century notions that much of the world now rejects. Even the Chinese, for all their rough behavior in the East and South China Seas, have never dared to annex a thickly populated land-space like the Crimea grab. Scrapping over rocks in the ocean is a far cry from an anchluss of a portion of a state Russia itself recognized (however resentfully) as sovereign. This traditionalist-statist-autocratic matrix of Russian governance – foreign adventurism and domination, tied to anti-western, messianic ideologies at home to prop-up cronyist dictatorship – is woefully out of place today. Its ideological satisfactions will soon collide with painful reality as this reactionary, ‘Dostoyevskian’ Russia is cut out of globalization and its wealth-creation.


The alternative to Putin’s ‘back to the future’ approach is some willingness to re-make Russia into a modern, post-power politics state where the hard work of domestic good governance reform replaces quasi-imperial impulses to contest American hegemony by steam-rolling neighbors. Such a state characterizes much of the world now. Well over half the world’s states today are democracies. Even China has peaceful transitions of power to contain corruption, encourage new blood, and provide (minimal) accountability. Previously backward places like Indonesia, Brazil, and India are increasingly better governed, roughly democratic, and integrated into the global economy. Even China, while still an oligarchy, is obviously better managed than Russia, and broadly willing to follow international rules in order to enjoy the returns of globalization, most obviously the foreign direct investment (FDI) that has powered its economic growth since the 1980s.

And herein lies the great challenge for Russia: to join the global economy fully, to benefit from the FDI and trade that has helped so many states become ‘emerging markets,’ will require a Russian willingness to sign-up for global rules broadly set by the West, specifically the Americans. Here China and Russia are a fascinating comparison. Deng Xiaoping realized decades ago that for China to modernize it would need to swallow its pride, at least for awhile, and function as a reasonably reliable partner in a liberal world order over which it had little control. Deng famously counseled China to “keep a low profile and bid our time.” While this was not full-blown subservience to the Americans, it did require a somewhat humiliating willingness to accept that the West did a lot things better than China, and that China had more to learn than vice-versa. Hence the huge wave of Chinese students in American universities. This is a wisdom of modesty that Putin, with his relentless machoism, shirtless photo-ops, and constant bluster, never learned. He would rather Russia be proud and impoverished, than follow the lead of the West – for at least a little while – in order to ignite growth.

What is Putin’s Endgame?

As far back as Thucydides, international relations theory has noted that states often act from foolish pride, out of an exaggerated sense of honor, even if it damages the national interest. Russia today fits this description. Badly governed, hugely corrupt, run by an egomaniac who would rather stunt his own economy and impoverish his neighbors than join American-led globalization, Putin is slowly demolishing Russia’s ability to be the very great power he so desperately wants us all to think it is.

The short-term, anti-western ideological satisfactions of Putinism spell-out no middle- or long-term future for Russia after Putin is gone (so maybe he does not care?). If Russia is going to ‘matter’ in international relations, bullying neighbors while the economy slides into oil rentierism and hemorrhages its best and brightest is a dead-end. Short-term, angry reflexes may keep Putin in power, and prop-up his ‘system,’ but will this spark Russian growth? Will it encourage the foreign direct investment that has propelled China to rival the US? Will it reduce Russia’s isolation, and the fear and discomfort it inspires in so many? And, perhaps most pressingly, what will happen when Putin finally retires? This is not a ‘system’ built to last.”

2 thoughts on “My October Diplomat Essay: Russia between Empire and Modernity

  1. Overall, this is a very typical Western (particularly UK-US) view of the flow of history, which completely ignores a reason, that at least to this layman observer in HK (thus out of the flow of a lot of indoctrination from both sides) is quite obvious, for why Russia does not go the China path.

    It comes down to this. Russia is reviled by the West while China often had the advantage of being a soft-spot.

    Examples that immediately come to mind is how the West re-interpreted the geographic term Kuriles (a bunch of relatively worthless islands) to keep it out of Russian sovereignty.

    Or how the West keeps screaming about Soviet tank divisions but tries to act like a sheep about certain aviation divisions that are on ships, as well as 3 Corps worth of naval infantry. Or certain bomber divisions.

    Or the Cuban Missile Crisis. As a person who has no particular sympathy for the Monroe doctrine, it is essentially a story of America placing missiles on Turkey to threaten Russia. Having finally gained an ally (despite the US’ best efforts) in the right position, the Russians feel putting some missiles in Cuba is fair play. Unfortunately, they have overestimated the maturity of the US who whines and bawls like a baby. Eventually, the Americans remove the missiles from Turkey, mostly because now they can just put missiles to threaten Russia on their subs.

    Or the whole INF treaty – were the Americans, who can just put all those Tomahawks on subs and deploy them in the North Sea (if we fill it up, this would be Europe!), hurt at all by this?

    Or CFE. From a retro perspective, the West has a schizophrenic attitude about the Soviet Ground Forces. Day 1 they play up the threat and how they’d be doomed (so the Soviets should cut). Day 2 they point to real and imagined flaws in the Soviet Armed Forces so they’d win (then you don’t need them cut to feel safe, do you). Well, anyway, CFE goes into effect, and even restricts Russian movements on Russian soil (the flank limit stuff) as the US moves its Marines on ships left right and center.

    To avoid being boring, I’ll jump to the Crimean thing. In essence, as you agree, the Russians were at least willing to let Ukraine keep Crimea. Unfortunately, then Yakie, who intelligently believes when you border a country you have to take its redlines into account when doing business, was ousted in a rather violent and non-Constitutional (thus at best quasi-legal, so was Hitler’s IIRC) manner by the Kievans (not all of Ukraine so I won’t say Ukrainian).

    (I must note … in a democratic country respecting the rule of law, the correct action here is to wait patiently. IIRC Yakie will go out around the end of this year anyway. Then you can vote in a EU-bootlicker and see if such a strategy works out.)

    On a normal day, the West would deplore the violence and not recognize any regime created by such means, but hey, it is anti-Russian and that apparently was the most important thing.

    Now, the Crimeans voted to join Russia. On any normal day, Western experts will agree that Crimea might well be the most “Russian” part of Ukraine and would likely have joined it given the chance. Not today. “You cheated, Russia! We can’t accept this! You must have cheated! And it is Unconstitutional.”

    (Gee, West, you didn’t care about that concerning the takeover, did you? Just as important, the Constitution in essence makes it impossible for the Crimea or any other region to secede, regardless of the circumstances. In such a case surely the normally dear Western principle of self-determination should take precedence)

    This half-hearted support for the less than legal Ukrainian regime prevents them from agreeing to a quick peace, so now we have pro-Russian insurgents. The West cries like a baby again (publicly. Privately, it must be almost cheering) when an airliner got shot down for venturing into a warzone (remember, even the United States cannot always prevent its own SAMs from shooting at *its own fighters*). As for the last count, the pro-Russian insurgents are winning and the West like a sore loser is unable to accept the result.

    Overall, you don’t need to be a Russian to see the West as taking “push-push-push” tactics when it comes to handling Russian relations. If you want to “try” China in the same way as the West tried Russia, try having the US somehow form an alliance with Russia, Vietnam and India. Then threaten to place troops, bombers, and a “defensive” ABM system that’s supposed to not be a threat. Flood the water outside their ports with your subs. Constantly use their relative economic weakness and pressure them into treaties to cut troops, missiles … etc and in such a way they don’t really apply to you. See how China would react.

    In comparison, the worst “indignity” China really suffers collaborating with the West in Real Life is having to put aside its territorial ambitions for a bit and listening to human rights talk. Given the circumstances, it is simply very safe for the Chinese to collaborate with the West temporarily, and very hard for the Russians. It is not so much the Russians not being able to accomodate, but that they are already nearly accomodating to their stops and the West is still pushing.

    And I think if the West wants real, friendly relationships (rather than a near Versailles like thing) with Russia, it has to at least recognize little things like this.


  2. Without going into detail, Russias conventional armed forces have hugely advanced.
    Dedovshina has been reduced, a considerable amount of the force is now made of professional contractniks, and military graft expenditures (a measure of how much of any ruble invested get stolen) are down from about 50-60% to somewhere about 20%.
    One should also note that your source on the conscript issue quotes Pavel Felgenhauer (of “Georgia will defeat Russia” fame), who is simply not someone to be taken seriously.

    Russias has also made considerable infrastructure investments (while not as much as it should have, also, graft) and the increase in living standart under Putin has been quite impressive.
    Hilariously enough, and quite contrary to Western perceptions, even under metrics like “how dangerous is it to be a Journalist in Russia”. Yelzins reign saw, by order of magnitudes, more dead Journalists then Putins.

    The thing with “Russia choosing modernity” is that the western enforced modernity has been attempted, and only resulted in very considerable human suffering. The West meanwhile used this time to do whatever it wanted to do.

    The Russian elite, and also about 9 out of 10 Russians I know, believe that the problem is not that Russia wants “Greatness”, Putin explicitly disavowed this at Valdai, the problem is that Russian wants independence, and its opinions respected in its near abroad. The West is having none of that.

    When “westernizers” talk about “integration into the global economy”, “global universal norms” etc. Russians are not the only ones who observe that those rules, especially the economic ones, curiously benefit western interests, and that the, de jure, restricting norms governing behaviour towards others are thrown out of the window by the west as soon as it feels like it.

    In a way, Putin is trying a third way. The Soviets tried being an enemy of the west, it didnt work. Under Yeltzin, Russia tried to be a part of the west, which didnt work either. Under Putin, it tried to be left alone, which worked pretty well, until the west moved so close that avoiding altercations became impossible.

    And this is, btw. a great and huge change from the Cold War. In the Cold War, it was the Soviet Union that tried to spread the World revolution, this automatically meant that it found few allies amongst those currently in power, and that it had usually had to spend more resources in attempts of crushing the Status Quo then the West/the USA had to spent to maintain it.
    Today, the USA is a revolutionary empire bent on a neoliberal bent of world revolution. Those enmeshed within the western consensus propably do not get how annoying/threatening/aggressive that western revolutionary neoliberal consensus is from the other side, but the frustration about this runs pretty deep.

    This does not mean that China, India or Brazil will “ally” with Russia in even the mid-term. The Chinese, to a lesser extent the Indians, are pretty happy that Russia plays “Anti-Imperialist wave breaker”, and attracts the attention of the western hegemony away from them. They will support Russia if it suits their interests, and even offer a helping hand (in return for Russian concessions) to Russia so that she can maintain her wave breaking function. But neither Beijing nor New Delhi have any inclination of paying the Russians for something they do for free.


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