I got this map from here. Very useful. The article below was originally published at the Lowy Institute last week, here.
In short, I don’t mind too much that the Koreans aren’t engaged on the South China Sea freedom of navigation dispute, because keeping their mouths shut and schmoozing the Chinese is necessary to get China to finally cut North Korea loose, which in turn is the only way North Korea will ever collapse. This is why I have never thought much of the criticisms that President Park Geun-Hye is a ‘sinophile.’ If you were South Korea, you would be too. If you lived next to giant China, and they were permanently bailing out your mortal enemy, then sucking up to them (within limits) is a good idea. I am not a big fan of PGH, but she has really gotten the Beijing-Pyongyang nexus right that her predecessors did not. Let her keep flattering Xi Jinping.
So you say that SK is a US ally and they’re getting a free-ride on the US, and therefore they should be involved in the SCS. Fair enough, but think a few steps further out. Getting China to dump Pyongyang is way more valuable than a little more weight on the scales in the SCS. SK can’t add much there, but openly throwing in with the US and Japan on the SCS would push Beijing back to Pyongyang when PGH’s schmoozing and flattering of Xi Jinping has done so much to push them apart. That’s hugely valuable.
Remember that NK will not collapse until China cuts it off, and that NK’s collapse is vastly more valuable to everyone – US included – than one more minor voice in the SCS flap.
The full essay follows the jump.
Last month at The Diplomat, Van Jackson made an important argument about South Korea’s increasingly notable silence freedom of navigation (FON) in the South China Sea (SCS). Jackson, like many analysts, recognizes growing Chinese misbehavior there, most obviously the destabilizing island reclamation strategy and expansive sovereignty claims it fuels. Jackson would like to see greater South Korea engagement (actually, any at all). He rightfully notes that the more unified the Asian front regarding rules in the western Pacific, the more likely China is to moderate.
Where is the ROK in the South China Sea?
South Korea is a US ally. As a trading state heavily dependent on open, safe sea lanes, it has a strong interest in FON rules. As a proximate neighbor of China, it has a similarly strong interest in China’s socialization into a rules-bound regional community. Countries around China’s periphery, from Japan south and west to India, worry that if China is not rebuffed in the East and South China Seas, then a sense of hegemonic dominance in the region may grow in Beijing. These minor conflicts are widely seen as the leading edge of the larger question of regarding China’s regional intentions as it grows ever stronger.
These concerns about China’s integration or rejection of regional rules are, of course, well-known, but Jackson helpfully fingers the growing unease in the US over South Korea’s hedging on China. Besides silence on the SCS question – on which almost every other regional state has weighed-in against China – the South Koreans also quickly signed up for the Chinese-led Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank, and they have dragged their feet for years on missile defense deployment (THAAD, or Terminal High Altitude Area Defense).
The corresponding American anxiety is predictable. In Washington, it seems obvious that South Korea should sign up with the US camp regarding China. The Republic of Korea (ROK) is a US ally who spends far less on defense than it otherwise would because of the US commitment. Why should the US provide world-class defense to the ROK without something in return?
Separating China from North Korea is Vastly More Valuable
The ROK’s silence on China in the region, and the trust, or at least credibility, which that brings in Beijing, has a huge benefit not mentioned in Jackson’s essay and elsewhere in this debate: gradually convincing China that it can safely give up its North Korean ‘buffer.’ The current Chinese-North Korean relationship is the coldest it has ever been in the post-Cold War period due to vigorous diplomacy by the current Park Geun-Hye administration and its necessary (if unfortunate) reticence on Chinese regional behavior. This Sino-North Korean drift is a fantastic turn of events which should not be jeopardized with minor South Korean gestures regarding the SCS.
North Korea is not economically self-sufficient – not even close, ironically, given its autarkic ideology. Specifically, North Korea has great trouble feeding its population on its own; the last time it had to, it suffered a famine that killed roughly 10% of its population. Nor can it power its machinery, vehicles, power-grids, and so on without fuel imports. Nor can its decadent elites enjoy the fruits of tyranny – mansions, cars, top-shelf liquor, yachts, and the rest – without a pipeline to the world and access to banks and credit. Permanent subsidization is required.
During the Cold War, the USSR and China were maneuvered into competing for a North Korean ‘tilt’ by sponsoring its inefficient economy. After the Cold War, the US, South Korea and Japan also occasionally subsidized the DRPK as part of various deals (which would invariably collapse). North Korea routinely asks the United Nations and any other country that will listen for aid of almost any sort as well.
But this decades-old ‘aid-hunt’ is slowing exhausting itself. Last year’s definitive UN report on North Korea’s ghastly human rights record makes it harder for UN agencies to assist Pyongyang without crushing criticism in the democratic world. The regionally relevant democracies – Japan, the US, and South Korea – have also been suckered once too often by the North to help again without serious concessions. The South Korean Sunshine Policy has been defeated twice at the polls, and the current US attitude of ‘strategic patience’ means in practice, no aid without verifiable denuclearization, which will not happen. The USSR is gone, and Russia today is too weak, economically stagnant, and underpowered in Asia, to play the supporting role it once did. Other rogues like Iran or Venezuela may sympathize with the North’s aggressive anti-Americanism but can hardly muster the aid flows needed.
That leaves China. China is the last lifeline. It provides the fuel that keeps the lights on and the cars on the road. It looks the other way on sanctions-busting luxury imports. Robust cross-border networks help meet basic needs for food, clothing, and consumer goods for the general population. China provides a location for North Korean financial activities, which are often illicit. Beijing gives diplomatic cover in international organizations, including blocking a referral of Pyongyang to the International Criminal Court. In the language of game theory, China is the final hunter in the ‘stag hunt’ game needed to pin down the North.
To cut this lifeline would almost certainly produce a regime crisis. The population would once again be thrown into the penury of the famine years, while at the top, the cash, lifestyle, and goodies for elites would dry up. Given that Kim family has essentially bought off the army brass for decades to prevent a coup, the prospect of Pyongyang elites turning on each other over a diminishing budgetary and resource pie is arguably the greatest threat to Kimist rule. The Kim family almost certainly senses this vulnerability.
Prioritizing North Korean Collapse
The end of Chinese support is a necessary (if not sufficient) cause for North Korea’s eventual collapse. South Korean President Park’s robust efforts to woo Beijing have helped push China and North Korea apart in the last few years. This is a huge achievement – arguably the most important in her otherwise scandal-laden presidency. For South Korea to weigh-in on the South China Sea would jeopardize this tenuous break-through. Beijing must believe South Korea is at least neutral regarding Chinese power before it will give up Pyongyang. Given that US forces are stationed in South Korea, Park must be flattering Xi Jingping quite a lot, and she has probably bit her tongue on other issues, like the SCS. But ultimately who cares? Cutting Pyongyang off from its last sponsor would be a sea-change and is well worth these costs.
Ideally, South Korea, as a fellow regional democracy and US ally with strong FON interest, would support the regional pushback on China in the SCS. But the realities of Chinese growth force tough choices. As I have argued before, rigid democratic maximalism regarding China will openly provoke it; Asia does not need ideological neocons. The democracies need to find ways to work with the realities of Chinese power without betraying core values. Abandoning Taiwan, for example, is a bridge too far in such accommodation. But in the South China Sea (and AIIB), a bit of South Korean silence or free-riding is a tolerable swap for a much greater gain. The US has many other allies/friends on the SCS issue. Laying the groundwork for the cessation of Chinese support for Pyongyang is of far greater strategic significance to the US, and just about everyone else, than the mild extra weight South Korea could bring on the SCS.
The problem with your argument and all arguments like this that they seem to be based on an alternative universe. For all the talk about “coldness” in the relationship, where is the significant, concrete Chinese behavior indicating that things have changed. The specifics in your article are all to the contrary: It provides the fuel that keeps the lights on and the cars on the road. It looks the other way on sanctions-busting luxury imports. Robust cross-border networks help meet basic needs for food, clothing, and consumer goods for the general population. China provides a location for North Korean financial activities, which are often illicit. Beijing gives diplomatic cover in international organizations, including blocking a referral of Pyongyang to the International Criminal Court. In the language of game theory, China is the final hunter in the ‘stag hunt’ game needed to pin down the North.
Moreover, your argument seems to detached from basic IR theory. So what if PGH is nice to Xi Jinping. Does that mean Beijing will override its realist interests which have guided its policy for NK for decades? And, China seems to be behaving just as realists predicted. China will abandon NK when it means the US will leave Korea and Korea will become neutral, ie, a de facto Chinese vassal. If that is PGH plan, so be it; but then fess up and stop whining when the US accommodates by getting closer to Japan.
China will act on Korea to maximize its influence. What does this mean? Keep Korea divided because as long as North Korea exists and is feeling threatened despite all the antics they pull on China they will always “come around” to China.
South Korea will continue operating as if China will allow some level of rapprochement or even reunification of the peninsula and try to curry more favors from China, when in fact China will continue keeping the peninsula divided.
It’s not an “either or” situation (even if it was, geopolitically SK is still far closer to the US than to the PRC). Certainly no one’s arguing that the Chinese-North Korean alliance has been scrapped. Just that it’s never been this severely deteriorated before. It might be worth reciprocating Beijing’s overtures and seeing how far one can go with that. “Fess up and stop whining when the US accommodates by getting closer to Japan.” Well, just remember that both Japan and the US buy far more Chinese exports than SK does.