Category Archives: International Relations Theory

Another Too-Realistic War Video Game: We Need a Book on this Topic…

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I guess bloodbaths are fun…

 

A few months ago, after endless referrals by my students that it was ‘totally awesome’ and ‘the real war on terrorism,’ I finally played the controversial Call of Duty: Modern Warfare 2. While much of it is entertaining to be sure, it is also disturbingly realistic and sadistic.  In fact, parts of it aren’t really ‘enjoyable’ at all, particularly the notorious airport massacre, where they expect you to mow down (yes, mow) civilians as a terrorist. (What psycho put that sequence in?) At the time, I said we really need a serious treatment of video games in IR. (I admit to being a fan of the Halo series, but in part because the aliens are silly non-human targets, so the ethical questions raised by ‘playing’ Modern Warfare are muted.)

Here we are again. I haven’t played this game, but who are these guys at Activision that come up with this stuff? A hat-tip here must go to Jon Westen for sheer stupefaction on this. There is so much wrong here, yet it is so obviously campy, I don’t know what to think. The best part has to be 0.14, with the smiling, chunky pre-teen blowing down the door for an Iraq-style house-to-house sweep. I know we are supposed to laugh (one can’t help it; check 0.44 when the fat guy falls over from the RPG back-blast), but isn’t it supremely immoral to laugh at realistically portrayed combat, especially when the military of the game’s target audience is involved in exactly this sort of urban combat? (The commercial is clearly modeled on Black Hawk Down.) I asked a similar question once before: is it moral to laugh at North Korea?

This raises a million good questions for a dissertation, although an interdisciplinary one, because the writer needs training in both communications and ethics to really get a handle on these issues. Here are just a few thoughts:

1. Without advocating censorship, is it ethically proper to take entertainment pleasure from direct, first-person involvement in realistic war scenarios? This strikes me as different from watching a war film that is realistic. No one would say that Saving Private Ryan or Platoon are enjoyable in the same way that these sorts of games are intended to be. The former are exposes that are tragic, and learning experiences for the audience on the horror of violence while nonetheless recognizing the moral necessity of force sometimes. In that sense they are good, and I recommend them in class. By contrast, games like this entertain through adrenaline rush: war is exciting not tragic, in the vein of the film 300 or Starship Troopers.

2. In defense of the games, the literature on battlefield stress does in fact identify the thrill of combat as one possible reaction. This theme was (badly) explored in the Hurt Locker last year. And in the far better Generation Kill, this is a topic of regular conversation among the soldiers, and the colonel in the last episode openly admits that he enjoyed the combat. (Patton said the same thing, that ‘war is hell,’ but he ‘would miss it so.’) And I imagine that in a dim way, that is what the game makers had in mind above when they made this commercial, particularly when they show the ‘combatants’ smiling as they blow stuff up. So we are all tempted by the thrill of killing? But aren’t these the sorts of Freudian, primordial, bloodlust instincts we want to tamp down? I think that is the ultimate moral problem of the commercial. War is supposed to be something awful and tragic; isn’t it political incorrect to show it as a kick-a– high like Hurt Locker or Ernst Juenger suggested? But if it really is that kind of high, are the Activision game designers just showing us our true nature? Tough…

Whoever writes this dissertation/book faces the obvious credibility problem that the field might laugh at it. That is an unfortunate by-product of IR’s stubborn determination to be as irrelevant as possible. But here are a couple possible tropes:

1. Our students, and many others, play these games a lot more than they read the world politics textbooks we assign them. They function, however badly, to communicate information about international relations to the public, and ignoring that out of professional hauteur is just arrogance. This is one reason why ‘IR and film’ courses have taken off in the last decade or so: so many people watch them. So the gap in literature, however silly it might initially appear, is there.

2. A distinction can be drawn between strategy games and first-person shooters (FPS). In grad school, I knew lots of fellow students who enjoyed the Civilization video game series, and just about anyone with an interest in history played Risk or Axis and Allies as a kid. (Risk taught me where Kamchatka was when I was 11.) These sorts of games focus on cost-benefit analyses, resource mobilization, probability estimations, etc. – i.e., game theory. The blood and death of war disappears behind primitive plastic representations, and the challenge is really bureaucratic not adrenal. By contrast, the ‘fun’ of the FPS is precisely the bloodbath, which is why they sell so much better and provoke so much more discussion.

3. The moral discomfort lies in the evolution of games from identifiably unreal entertainment into real-life simulations. Barnett makes the astute observation that unmanned drones used in combat are miniaturizing in such a way that they increasingly resemble the model planes people can build in their backyards. Gaming is similarly blurring these sorts of lines. I recall reading that race car drivers were practicing on the Gran Turismo video game, as were pilots on Microsoft’s Flight Simulator game. When I visited Ft. Jackson, SC once on an educator’s tour, they showed us how FPS video game technology was adapted for training simulations, and, of course, the Army has come in for all kinds of criticism with its America’s Army game, which, its detractors claim, is a shameless recruitment tool that militarizes high school. My point is that the more video games are like virtual reality, rather than a playful pause or break from reality, the more criticism will grow of disturbing content. It is the simulation of reality, not the violence itself, that so worries people (that is why Halo-style alien-invasion games are never so controversial).

So if you are a closet video junky, here is your excuse to intellectualize your couch-potato-ness. It could be a very interesting book.

When to Just Give Up on Territory Disputes: Palestine, Kashmir, Dokdo?

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imagesCA5GWV6N

One of the most basic tenets of almost all IR theorizing is that states are territorial, literally, and obsessed with holding, if not expanding what space they have. Even if you aren’t Alexander the Great or Napoleon, out to conquer whatever is there, you still want to hold on to at least what you have. Territory is a fundamental requirement of statehood (ask the Kurds), and more is better given land’s inherent scarcity. The logic for this is simple. There is only so much real estate in the world. Barring extreme scenarios like suddenly easier land reclamation (from the sea) or interplanetary colonization, space on earth is finite. So the race to control space is by definition a zero-sum game (the Scramble for Africa). If I have it, then you don’t. The more you have, the more secure you are from others (the further away they are), the more people you probably have, the more resources you are likely to find under the ground, etc.

And this logic is backed up by loads of empirical evidence. The Japanese fight individually with Russia, Korea, and China about islands. The USSR and China fought a border war, as did the PRC and Vietnam. The US Union invaded the Southern Confederacy. The Israelis and Palestinians seem ready to kill each other over inches of barren desert. I recall reading somewhere that after the Israeli withdrawal from the Sinai, Egypt sued Israel in the World Court over several hundred feet of extra space Israel wanted to hold for a hotel or something. (Egypt won.) And the above map makes clear just how severe the territorial dilemma can be for micro-states like Israel. (Do not take the source of the map as my endorsement of Israeli policy in the occupied territories; I chose it just because it makes my point well.) No state wants to be dismembered, and lots of blood in history has been spilt trying to expand one’s land space (imperialism).

But Israel’s endless troubles holding the Palestinians, much less converting the Palestinian space and people into exploitable resources rather than manpower and money sinks, or India’s endless quest to quell and hold Kashmir, raise a good IR theory question: when is it time to just give up and take less? I am not sure if this question has been researched much because we worry, obviously, more about expansionism and irredentism than voluntary cession. But there are some good examples of this also. This article got my thinking how Sudan’s Arab elite has simply decided to throw in the towel after 25 of years of civil war with the south. 15 years ago, Ethiopia’s government decided to do the same with Eritrea. And Britain, I think, secretly hopes the Northern Irish Catholics will outbirth the local Protestants and vote for republican unification, hence ridding Britain of the endless Irish question. In Korea, I frequently argue that Korea needs Japan more than Japan needs Korea, because NK is so scary, unification with it will be so expensive, China is so big, and the US is in relative decline in Asia. Hence, it would make national security sense for Korea to try to come to some kind of deal on its island dispute with Japan (the Liancourt rocks [Dokdo]). Better relations with Japan would help Korea prepare for the Chinese challenge and bolster it in the stand-off with NK. Nor is there anything of value on Dokdo (it’s a bunch of rocks, like most of the West Bank too) and because it is uninhabitable, control of Dokdo has no implications for division of the sea or seabed. In short, the benefits of a deal are high.

So there is a cost-benefit analysis at work here. At some point, an enduring, costly stalemate may just not be worth it. I can see a few reasons why:

1. Your country is already pretty huge, or the land disputed is comparatively tiny. If I were India, I think I would be pretty close to giving in on Kashmir. India is huge, both geographically and demographically already. How much does Kashmir really matter when you already have 1.3 billion people ? For Israel though, the problem is much more acute. The IDF has argued for years that the West Bank adds ‘strategic depth’ to little Israel, which, disregarding the  moral dimension, is accurate. By this dimension, the Eritrean succession surprises me, because it land-locked Ethiopia. I would have thought that would be a national interest worth toughing it out for…

2. There are no natural resources or other immediate, tangible national interests. Dokdo’s control does not alter any material element in the Korea-Japan relationship. If anything, it wastes Korean money to artificially keep people and services stationed there that would not otherwise exist but for this dispute. This is no ‘resource war.’ So what great benefit do you get beyond that patriotic tingle in your chest?

3. The disputed territory is not ‘holy ground.’ I think this is the most tricky condition, because these sorts of disputes, zero-sum in nature and frequently rooted in long-standing neighborhood grudges, are exactly the sort of thing that get layered in over-heated nationalist rhetoric about holy struggles, national identity, God-given missions and all that sort of metaphysical talk. Witness the Jewish right in Israel talking about biblical claims from Moses to the West Bank, or Hamas’ reverse claim (also made up) of the centrality of Jerusalem to Mohammed’s revelation (it was just a sideshow in the big Arabian picture). For a hysterical and mawkish Korean version of Dokdo as holy ground, try here (be sure to listen to the song). I think there is a good dissertation here.

Post-Western Global Governance?

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bric

These two articles really got me thinking recently about the the complexity of global governance (GG), and whether it can realistically absorb new powers, much less define itself meaningfully to policy-makers. In fact, sometime I wonder, because I teach international organization (IO), if GG even exists at all. Randy Schweller, one of my grad school profs, says basically GG is a mash-up of rules, institutions, norms, and everything else that is so complex that is effectively unanalysable. And Thomas Weiss, quite the opposite paradigmatically of Schweller, basically says the same, and that we should go back to looking at world government (hear, hear!).

I wrote my dissertation on the IMF and World Bank in the (ever-so-quaint 1990s, pre-9/11) belief that global governance was a meaningful idea, that rules could slowly creep up on the world, that most of those rules would come from liberal internationalist thinking primarily rooted in the West, and that all this was a good thing. Even belonged to the UN Association of the USA before 9/11. Yet after years of struggling to make this an analytically coherent idea (and subscribing to the excellent journal), I have given up mostly. My own research has turned back to states instead of the tortured mix of NGOs, IO, MNCS, rules, norms, regimes, etc, etc, that are somehow supposed to interrelate into multilateral, multilayered, multisectoral, networked, transnational, social constructed, complex, I-don’t-know-which-way-is-up-anymore GG. When I teach IOs, after I go through all this with the students, and they ask me for the one-liner on GG (because all good ideas can ultimately be expressed simply), I say GG is (dysfunctional) world government-light. Hence Schweller’s piece caught my attention. GG is so complex and such a confusing notion, that it obscures as much as it clarifies. And Weiss is wonderful in his frustration that no one really knows wth GG is, and that the world government discussions of the past (after the two world wars) were much more understandable and analytically useful.

Beyond the confusion though, is my growing sense that as the non-western world gets its act together slowly in the coming decades, all this GG talk will just look like preening academic liberal internationalism, our hubris in trying to extend a system basically built for the West (plus Japan) to everyone else. But everyone else (Huntington’s famous ‘the rest’) probably don’t really want to live by the rules that we have set up. In the same way that Japan never really liked its semi-membership in the Concert of Europe and never really followed its norms (it stormed around Korea and China regardless of what Bismarck or Earl Grey thought), I think the emerging powers of the world will probably be more inclined to truculence and grievance than assimilation.

Walt calls this the end of the Atlantic Era; Mead says it is the death-throes of liberal internationalism. Increasingly, sadly to be sure, I think this is right, and increasingly my own IR thinking has drifted from optimistic liberalism to fearful realism. It makes me miss the 1990s so much. Before 9/11, the US was strong enough that we could indulge in Eurocentric intellectual flights of fancy that everyone wanted to live like us (the Washington Consensus of the indispensible nation), and that if only they followed the rules (GG), they could. But the rest of the world has been ‘rising’ (ie, modernizing, ie, it getting its act together) for several decades now, and there are a lot more of them (the Rest) than of us (the West), so inevitably as the BRICs (above map) and such come on-line, they are going to change the implementation of the rules, if not the rules themselves, if only because of their sheer bulk. China and India each have 1.3+ billion people. How can they not impact just about everything? I once heard the president of the World Bank say there would be 20 billion more people born by 2050, and 90% of them would be born outside the West. There is your one-liner for the future, not some academic tinkering about NGO access to UN specialized agencies.

Compounding these structural de-westernization trends, is the massive sinkhole of western power and strategy that the GWoT has become. The US would be declining relatively to the new risers anyway, but the $3 trillion spent on Iraq vastly accelerated this process. Does anyone remember predictions just a decade ago that China would rise so fast? Of course not, because no expected the US to shoot itself in the foot (if not the head) so badly since 9/11.

So my question then is how do we put together rules for the new post-western era. The UN, built to fail by sovereignty-obsessed nation-states, has therefore failed. It reflects a simpler world, where much of the world’s population was unsocialized, unmobilized peasantry under imperial or semi-feudal rule. So, as Schweller notes, GG was easier. There were fewer players, and they were all pretty culturally close. Today it is running the other way as previous marginalized peoples around the globe get richer, get to TVs and the Internet, complain more (especially about the US), vote their grievances, and otherwise make the liberal rules harder to enforce.

Finally, this doesn’t mean the US will be poorer or weaker, but it does mean the US will have less room to maneuver and that it will be harder to bully others into doing what we think is right for them (even if it is good for them). It’s not the decline of the US or the West, unless you equate unipolarity and Western cultural hegemony with the ‘normal’ status of the world.

It’s the 1930s All Over Again…

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currency

The increasing drift toward a ‘currency war’ should worry just about everyone. And it is remarkable given that we already went through this in the 1930s – a collective disaster for all involved, and which everyone realized afterwards was a huge error. Yet here are on the cusp of another round of beggar-thy-neighbor devaluation rounds as everyone seeks to export their way out of the recession.

In case you don’t know the history, start here. Just about everyone learns this story in Econ 101, but here is the quick version: The Great Depression struck in 1929, and everyone panicked. In that sort of adverse environment, everyone starts to save. This is individually rational, as savings represent a hedge against suddenly increased uncertainty about the future. You see that same thing today in the US as Americans are suddenly saving again to pay off their housing and credit card debt in order to get financially sounder. Unfortunately, as people save, they are not spending, and their spending ultimately creates jobs. When you buy stuff at Walmart, a whole slew of people got their jobs to bring you whatever it is that you just bought. This is the well-known paradox of thrift: while it is rational for you the individual to save ask a hedge against the future, if everyone does that, then our collective future gets that much worse because all that missing consumer spending (demand) eventually creates unemployment (less need for supply). Again, this is what is happening today in the US. As Americans retrench on their spending very suddenly and sharply (household savings rates have jumped something like 5% in 24 months), you get a consequent drop in the need for supply. That in turn means you don’t need so many workers to make that supply anymore, so people get fired. US unemployment has therefore suddenly spiked as savings rates spiked.

One good way out of this recessionary trap (high savings –> high unemployment –> worsening economy –> even more fear about the future –> more savings) is to export to others. If others buy your stuff, then you keep all the employment (to supply the foreigners’ demand), but your own consumer can still continue to save. It is a tempting way out that squares the mathematical circle in which, in a closed economy, savings must equal unemployment. But with exports, you can have your cake and eat it too; ie, the economists’ expression ‘export your way out of a recession.’ Now, a good way to make your exports cheaper is for your currency to be cheap against other currencies. Then your stuff is cheaper for foreigners to buy. It is therefore tempting for governments in recession to intervene artificially in currency markets to keep their currencies cheap, indeed maybe even undervalued (China today). Because a cheaper currency means cheaper exports means a quicker route out of recession. And in the 1930s, everybody tried to do this. But just like the paradox of thrift, if everyone tries to cheapen their currency, then no one’s currency becomes cheaper, and very quickly you can get a cycle of government-forced exchange rate devaluations across the board as everyone tries to get a price advantage over everyone else. We call this ‘beggar-thy-neighbor.’

It is now universally acknowledged by just about everyone (except Marxists I suppose) that this was a disaster that lengthened the Great Depression considerably. This intellectual consensus lies behind the creation of the IMF, and the IMF museum (next to the lobby in the Fund building) walks the visitor through this in excellent detail.

And now we are doing it all over again.

So much for learning from history and all that…

This time it is mostly Asians to blame. China, SK, and Japan all intervene regularly (‘fine-tuning’ they call it in SK) to keep their currencies lower than the market would otherwise say. China of course is the worst, and it is leading to some genuinely desperate policy ideas on what to do.

This leads me to two conclusions. First, it is evidence that global governance (GG) continues to fail. The G-20 squabbling over exchange rates so perfectly fits what we know states shouldn’t do, yet they are doing it anyway. This – along with the astonishing, ‘I-don’t-give-a-damn-what-the-world-thinks’ Bush unilateralism – tells me that GG was a dream of the 1990s that is fading fast. Second it tells me that the only answer is cultural change in Asian attitudes toward imports. For decades, a trade surplus (and if necessary, an undervalued currency) were not just natural outcomes of market processes, but an explicit statist-developmental goal wrapped in nationalism. A trade surplus is a mark of national pride and success in the world, and if Asian consumers must be punished with high prices and higher savings to get it, then so be it. In Korea, I see this ‘imports-are-bad’ everyday; contrast that with the American love of cheap Chinese stuff at Walmart. Given that barrier to Asian rebalancing is a cultural one – getting Asians to accept imports without mercantilist-nationalist distaste – that rebalancing is likely to take a long time. Culture changes slowly.

China, Japan, and these Fights over Islands

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diaoyut

 

There has been lots of good commentary recently over the China-Japan flap about the fishing captain. (Start here and here.) I tend to agree that China is setting itself back 5 to 10 years with the neighbors, and that this is the somewhat predictable behavior of a ‘rising’ state. Just about everyone expects China’s appetites to grow as its power grows. It is reasonable to expect China to get pushier in its backyard as it grows, just as the US did in Latin America in the late 19th century. I have just a few extra thoughts:

1. All these left over island disputes leave China (and Japan, Korea, Russia, and ASEAN) with lots of friction points. Just last week, the Japanese told the Russians not to visit their disputed islands either. The standard liberal internationalist answer would be to create some joint committee (indeed, boundary demarcation is one of the few things the World Court does well) to iron out the details. But this has never really happened out here, as it has in other places, like South America, where geography also created confusion. (In SA, it was the highest peaks of the Andes that made the lines unclear.) But in Asia, I have the sneaking suspicion that these island/sea disputes never get resolved in part, because domestic elites don’t really care that much; indeed they may like having them around once in awhile for patriotic rallying purposes. They serve an unremarked domestic utility: These disputes are low cost. They can simply be ignored when necessary. A few rocks here or there have no real economic value; according to UNCLOS, if the rocks are uninhabitable without external provision (ie, food and potable water must be transported in), then possession of the islands has no impact on the claims to the surrounding water either. That is why fishermen so frequently seem to spark these flaps; the seas are wide open to everyone. But because these conflicts-in-waiting are always still hanging around, they can be turned on and off at will – whenever domestic leaders need a rally-round-the-flag effect. This is probably especially useful for deeply illegitimate regimes like China or Russia, or in Japan with its endless rotation of governments in search of credibility. In this, I am reminded of the oft-made accusation that Israel’s Arab neighbors don’t really want the Palestinian-Israeli conflict resolved, because it is a nice deflector of public unhappiness at home.

2. One unremarked deep cause of these flaps is Japan’s slow erosion. Most of the excitement focuses on rising China. But just as important is the steady decline of Japan. If Japan were still rising, as it was until the 1990s, the competition here would be quite different – two rising powers side by side (like India and China). But in the western Pacific, China is walking away with the game because both the US and Japan are in decline, and ASEAN remains in its perpetual disorganized dither. This would create space for China, even if it weren’t booming. But it is, hence doubling the power shift. In fact, this is the weakest Japan has been vis China since the Opium War upended China-Japan relations 170 years ago. This is the most important Asian balance of power shift since the West arrived in East Asia. We are moving back toward the 18th C (not the 19th), when China was dominant in the neighborhood.

3. The Chinese leadership is increasingly boxed in by nationalized opinion. 20 years of patriotic reeducation on the national humiliation has created an unhappy nationalistic youth in China with prestige grudges against Japan and the US. As China gets wealthier and more connected, it will become harder and harder for the CCP to avoid dealing with this, and these island fights are a useful outlet, per point 1 above.

4. China will have a harder time carving out a backyard than the US did. Latin America has been weak for centuries and the rest of the world was far way, so there was an easy vacuum for the US to fill. In Asia, China is next to India, Japan, South Korea, and, a bit further out, Australia. All of them have a much better capacity to push back than Mexico, Argentina, or Brazil ever did. (PS: The Economist says the Monroe Doctrine is dead now. I don’t buy it.)

‘Responsible’ Sovereignty vs the Responsibility to Protect

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rwandan_african_union_soldier

The ramp up in drones and special operations in the GWoT has me thinking we are stumbling into a future of unspoken limitations on sovereignty.

Limits on sovereignty is an old story, and one of the classic points of disagreement in IR. Usually, it pits realists against liberals – the general lines being that states won’t really cede any authority to a higher institution, while liberals scramble to find examples from the UN system to suggest that sovereignty is slowing leeching away. The ‘institutional’ debate is wrapped up in globalization too. Globalization supposedly makes the world more interdependent. More interdependence means more rules are needed, so states will slowly give up some prerogatives in order to get the benefits of the global economy. Earlier generations of IR talked about ‘spillover,’ as states slowly slid into more rule-bound orders, almost unconsciously.

But now we are seeing something different. Now, we see the US (usually) telling countries that if they can’t get their act together internally, we will take action. The issue is the responsible use of your sovereignty (RS). If you turn your country over  to drug lords, proliferators, pirates, terrorists, etc, then you are gambling with your sovereign inviolability (Afghanistan, northern Pakistan). Or even if you don’t agree to turn over your state to such non-state and if it happens against your will, others will still feel it ok to intrude (Somalia, Congo).

This most definitely does not fit the traditional liberal IR image of sovereignty cession. It is a product of state-weakness (Somalia) or nastiness (Taliban Afghanistan), not democratic decision-making or spill-over (the EU).

If intruding on sovereignty used ‘irresponsibly’ sounds like another neo-con excuse for democratic imperialism (it is), one can always try the liberal internationalist version of this – ‘the responsibility to protect’ (R2P). R2P puts a lefty spin on this by saying that the government has a responsibility to protect its own people; i.e., governments can’t prey on their own people as in Sudan. Governments that continue to do so will ultimately face international sanction and an agreement by the great powers, ideally through the UN Security Council, to step into your affairs to protect your own people from you. Obviously, this only happens in extreme circumstances (Kosovo, Rwanda), and the Chinese, with their regular opposition to any ‘intervention in internal affairs,’ will oppose it. But nevertheless, R2P thinking clearly suggests that human rights sensibilities are now so advanced, that there are extreme limits to sovereignty, and that is almost certainly a good thing. Governments can do a lot, but they can’t do anything anymore.

If this sounds kind of benign, focused on human rights and the domestic population’s well-being, ‘responsible sovereignty’ is a little scarier, because it is focused on outsiders’ well-being (defined by them of course), and it explicitly embraces the use of force by outsiders to protect themselves from you and your carelessness. So if Sudan is a good example of the R2P logic – a nasty state tearing up its own people which should get whacked a bit by the international community for doing that – then Somalia is a good example of RS – failed state so out of any domestic control, and thereby becoming so dangerous to the rest of us, that it has essentially forfeited its right to manage itself and foreigners will do (some of) it for them. Is this neocolonialism?

Finally, the US has already flirted with RS before the declaration of preemption by the Bush administration. A century ago, in the Roosevelt and Wilson Corollaries to the Monroe Doctrine, the US reserved the right to intervene in Latin America should its governments become too ‘disorderly.’ The neo-con update of this idea is to expand it worldwide, which I can’t help wondering if the US can really afford now, with a $1.5 trillion deficit. Sounds like overstretch all over again…

Pop Culture and International Relations Theory

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Just about everyone plays video games now, and a sizable chunk model international relations in one way or another. Over the years, I have noticed that students have picked up ‘information’ from games – just as they do from film – which filters into the classroom. For example, I had a student once who insisted on basing his cyberterrorism paper on the scenario of Die Hard 4. Film, and increasingly now video games, are a shared language and pool of narratives among our undergraduates. They provide common stories and references, just as the transmission of Homer did among the Greeks. But the big films of the last 40 years are the stories they know now: my students are far more likely to know the Star Wars mythology than classical myth. Yoda has replaced Zeus, and Halo replaced the Iliad as a depiction of combat.

This raises all sorts of interesting pedagogical questions, and it places a burden on us as teachers to at least be mildly informed of what they watch and play. (If you don’t,  students think you are a hopelessly out of touch dork they can’t relate to, and hence, you are less likely to reach them.) The study of IR film is mature, but I have yet to see any serious treatment of video games as either depiction of international relations or as teaching tools. Duck of Minerva has touched on this a little bit. But this topic needs to be really worked on by someone in IR with an interest in communications. It doesn’t strike me as a well-organized enough topic for a dissertation, but definitely an MA. If Lord of the Rings can be discussed as an IR teaching tool, then so should gaming. Most of our students now game. Military games are hugely popular – including a bestseller released by the US Army itself originally designed as an in-house simulation and now used as a recruiting tool. Such games regularly include depictions of war, the normative concern behind IR’s very existence. At the very least we should think about how this impacts what they bring to class.

Sound ridiculous? Actually, in my experience in the classroom, it’s not at all. Whenever a big war or history movie shows up in theaters, we inevitably discuss it in class, because students ask questions about it or it otherwise creates such a stir in the larger society. So frequently did I notice this when I first started teaching, that I actually bought a few movies that I was asked about most, because I thought it was a good idea to know them well – including Black Hawk Down, Saving Private Ryan, Apocalypse Now, JFK, and the Hurt Locker. This has been a constant experience in teaching undergrads. It may depress more mature readers and IR observers, but it is nonetheless a reliable element of teaching undergrads. In fact, so prevalent are references to Black Hawk Down especially, that I even read the book, because I fielded so many questions on it.

I don’t have the training in media studies for this, but two video games which I have played leap out to me as relevant in IR – the Civilization series and the Modern Warfare series. Civilization is essentially a state-building simulation, complete with interaction with other states, including warfare. But Modern Warfare is far more important given how much the games have sold and how directly they model the current GWoT. The sequel is basically  ‘Iraq War- the video game,’ which is pretty shocking the first time you see it. Sequences are ripped straight out of the documentary Generation Kill. The battle-realism of the violence is far beyond anything you have seen in a game before. The gunfire, killing, and destruction are extreme and amazingly graphic. There are no aliens that are morally easy to dispatch by the battalion (Halo, Quake, etc). Instead your character knifes people, shoots dogs (yes, that’s right), and fairly easily racks up ‘collateral damage.’ At one point, your character even participates in a terrorist massacre at an airport (video above), which generated a big controversy apparently. Quite honestly, it is a shocking sequence in the game – you are expected to participate in machine gunning hundreds of civilians! The sequence creeped my wife out so much she made me turn the game off. This is calling out for a serious treatment.

Summer Reading – We’re off to Africa – Back in August

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200px-Big-risingsun

I have been blogging non-stop for a year and several months. I need a break for the summer. So we are off on safari to the southern cone of Africa. Too bad the State Department has a travel warning for Kenya, but Victoria Falls, the Serengeti, and Olduvai Gorge sound pretty great…

So here is some reading for you. The following is heavy beach stuff – i.e., it is not so dumb for the beach that it wastes your time, but it is not so serious that you need to read it with a pen and can’t take it to the beach to begin with.

1. Rising Sun, by Michael Crichton, 1992. This is the ‘best’ book I have read about Asia in the last year, in that I enjoyed it a lot for the sheer paranoia and camp value of it. If you want to read seriously about Asia, there are lots of good books out there, but nothing gets to Western paranoia about ‘rising Asia’ in such an entertaining way as this. I remember reading 20 years ago, when people actually believed it. It freaked me out then too, but now, it is just a laugh riot: Japanese cowboy-wannabees buying up the Great Plains, the Japanese businessmen ‘Tuesday meeting’ where they control the US economy, omnipresent surveillance at work, sell-out American pols. It’s all there, so much campy goodness. It’s like the Red Dawn-version of Asian business. Who can’t enjoy this nationalist feeding frenzy that, today, looks irresponsibly badly researched? And no, the movie can’t replace the sheer camp, japanophic paranoia of the book.

2. The Conservative Soul, by Andrew Sullivan, 2006. This is the best book on US conservatism I have read in a long time. I used to think of myself as a conservative in the 90s, but W was so bad, that I drifted. This is the best analysis of what happened. I see myself as conservative in temperament, but disgusted with the course of the Republican Party in the last decade. Bush was a nadir in the history of the presidency. Many serious conservatives know this. Sullivan and David Brooks particularly played a critical socratic gadfly role for the American right during the Bush years. Occasionally I watch Fox for an ‘ideology fix,’ and I leave consistently disturbed at what passes for conservative commentary on the right’s central media organ. But I left the book saddened. Sullivan’s image of the conservative as doubter and skeptic was accurate to my mind, but also enervating and tragic. It presents what Charles Lindblom famously called ‘muddling through’ – depressingly mundane enough – plus, a tragic eye thrown backward on what we have lost both in civilization and in our own personal lives. This vastly transcends the Fox-Palin variant that has taken over in the US with the Tea Party and such. It is as insightful as Lind or Phillips’ work, but much philosophically richer.

3. China Rising, by David Kang, 2008. Ok, this one is a little academic, but it is the best title I have read on Asia in awhile, and that is all I read these days. Way too much of the literature on Asia is journalistic and boosterish, with titles like ‘China will rule the world soon,’ or the ‘inevitable power shift.’ Too often, CNN-style trend-spotting substitutes for analysis, and I troll through far too much of that c— everyday in my daily reading. Yawn. I am sick of being told about power shifts, tectonic changes, new orders, etc. in an easy journalistic fashion (maybe that includes my blog…). How about some rigorous analysis for a change? Kang is one of the best Asian IR scholars, and I think this book gets a lot right, even if China worries me more than him.

4. Guns, Germs and Steel, by Jared Diamond, 2005. If you haven’t read this, then you have missed one of the most important popular social science books in the last decade. The prose is elegant. The case work exciting, new, and reasonably convincing. But most importantly, it is good macro-theory, which is so rare these days. Macro-theory is easy; anyone can pose as Hegel or Marx and claim to ‘unlock’ world history, with just a few variables, but usually it is self-serving bunk (think religious fundamentalism, e.g.). Diamond actually does it convincingly, and he can reach the non-social scientist. You’ll never get a better explanation for the sad fate of so many indigenous peoples. It can be heart-breaking.

5. Civilization, by Kenneth Clarke, 1969. I am an amateur in art, but if I read the above stuff all day, my head would explode – so here is something that has absolutely nothing to do with Asian security or US foreign policy. Clark connects meaning to art in way that really helps you understand why so much art is ‘great’ when you really don’t know why yourself. You’ve heard the Mona Lisa is amazing your whole life, but it just looks like a smiling woman, right? I have this same problem, which is why I am a social scientist I imagine. But Clark will walk you through it, teach you what you don’t see in so much of what you have been told is a ‘classic.’ By the time you finish, you’ll think about just how pointless your profession really is compared to the timelessness of the something like Chartres or Guernica.

 

I will try to post a bit from the travels, but I imagine that will be hard. Check back again in August.  REK

The Chiang-Mai Initiative is Freaking Out the IMF

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For some basic details on the IMF’s relevance in this post-Great Recession world, try here. Or read the IMF’s own publication, Finance & Development, which obsessively navel-gazes over the IMF’s own role.

So last month, I was a selectee for an internal IMF research project on its continuing relevance in Asia. Yikes! That should set off alarm bells. Neither the cover letter nor the interviewer mentioned the Chiang-Mai Initiative (CMI), but it was clear as day if you know about Asian attitudes toward the IMF. In short they loathe it. In fact, they loathe it so much, they want to build their own local version. After the Asian financial crisis (AFC), Japan proposed an “Asian Monetary Fund” (AMF), which the US shot down. At the time, the US was the indispensible nation at the end of history. What all that ‘America-is-awesome’ rhetoric really meant was that we were the uncontested hegemon with our fiscus in order, so we could push the Washington Consensus pretty hard. Today though, the US is a mess, and Asia is feeling its oats. So here we are again.

It was pretty easy to see from the questions that the IMF is really nervous about this. CMI is basically the AMF warmed over, although no one wants to come out and say so. Asians want it, because when the AFC hit, the IMF conditions on the bail-outs were tough. But unsurprisingly they were necessary – really necessary actually. Asian economies are far too export-dependent, mercantilist, corrupt, and oligarchic, and the Fund helped somewhat loosen the death-grip of politically-connected conglomerates on the economies out here. As usual, the Fund was demonized for providing good advice that was necessary. One reason why the AFC was so short, and the region’s economies bounced back so fast, was the IMF’s necessary pain. But no one ever thanks the Fund. It’s far easier to blame it for domestic political point-scoring.

So this time, the Asians are going to create their own currency pool, with their own Asian rules – whatever that means. In a way, one could see as part of the Great Recession-inspired fantasy of ‘de-coupling.’ (Tell me how you decouple from globalization and not fall behind lightning fast?) But they say, Asia should look inward, with its own rules and such. The irony, of course, is that conflict has already erupted between the likely lenders (China and Japan) and the likely borrowers (ASEAN) over what the rules over the loans should be. It’s the clash over conditionality all over again – except far more demur and behind-closed-doors, because of ‘ASEAN Way’ sensitivities that Asian countries should not publically criticize each other (lest that open the door for Western lecturing and preening). Asian leaders love the CMI for the distance it creates from the West and the Fund, but the fight over rules-set will mirror those of the Fund. The other big benefit for Asia, or rather for its elites, is that an neo-AMF/CMI will be far kinder toward ‘state-capitalism’ – all the rage now, as it is supposedly superior to liberal economics. The CMI will provide bail-outs and conditionality which push Southeast ASEAN borrowers to modernize as Northeast Asian donors have – directed state investment, aggressive mercantilism, (semi-)closed politics.

This is unfortunate to my mind for two reasons:

1. Obviously, propping up authoritarians capitalism has an anti-democratic ring to it. The last thing, politically, that Southeast Asia needs is more cheerleading to concentrate political-economic power in a small, almost-closed elite. Insofar as the Fund promotes economic neoliberalism, there has always been an oblique pressure to openly politically therefore as well. This will now be lost, as the CMI is certain to follow the ‘ASEAN Way’ of no political commentary.

2. If you bracket this political concerns, there are clear economic worries. A CMI fractures the global financial system, just as the proliferation of free trade areas in Asia is fracturing the WTO universal trade system, and Chinese pressure increasingly threatens to regionalize the Internet. This year’s ‘multilateralization’ of the CMI means it is now a genuine systemic-institutional threat to the Fund. This is almost certainly the proximate cause of the worried IMF survey on its relevance.

So I felt bad for the Fund (who EVER says that?) All the questions from the interviewer were about the Fund’s continuing relevance, what its role in Asia should be, and perhaps most telling, should it have a role? That inspired real discomfort.  I can only imagine what interviewer heard from Koreans – who feel they were turned upside down by the IMF even though the bail-out probably prevented street rioting – and Indonesians- where the AFC did end in street rioting and government collapse. The prime minister of Malaysia at the time even said the AFC was caused by ‘Jewish speculators.’

I should only add in the Fund’s defense that when I talk with Koreans and other Asians, most have no good sense of what the IMF should do differently, because most have no grasp of what it actually does. All will tell you that it should reform, but like most of the anti-globalization protestors, their ideas are vague or indicate that they don’t understand the, albeit highly technical, IMF. (I even wrote my dissertation on this topic.) Most seem to think that the bailouts should come cost- and change-free, but all that does it move the costs somewhere else – to the OECD taxpayers providing the Fund’s bailout resources – nor does it help clear up the problems that created the crisis in the first place. The great irony is that although Asians loathe the Fund, they actually learned the appropriate lessons from it in 1997 and were much better able to withstand the next crisis in 2008, the Great Recession. Pity the Fund. It does its job pretty well, but everyone hates it anyway…

Global Security in 7 Minutes! (3. Solutions)

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The following are from remarks I made in a lightning 7 minute whirlwind on global security threats. Part one is here; part two is here.

Let’s start with three institutional/multilateral solutions that aren’t:

1. The UN and regional organizations. Pity the UN. I want it to work as much as anyone. I used to belong to the UN Association of the USA, but one must be brutally honest that the UN is not a global security architecture that works. UN collective security has only been used twice (Korea, the Gulf War), and in Korea it happened only because the Soviets were boycotting the UNSC at the time. Never again would they make that mistake. But what has the UN done about Iran, terrorism, NK, or, arguably, Israel? The UN has no army; it cannot raise money independently. Its few military engagements have been ham-strung by the dual-key command problem. UN peacekeeping’s record is mixed at best. Robust missions are generally rejected; the blue-helmets never have the weapons, logistical support, or great power commitment to really be decisive. To be fair, the UN was designed to fail. The states wanted a weak body unable to infringe on their sovereignty and dependent on them for resources. You get what you (don’t) pay for. The same applies to regional bodies like the OAS or AU. Even NATO now is a joke. Does anyone really believe European members would war for islamizing Turkey, or that the US would rescue Lithuania from the Russians?

1.a. The greatest disappointment here must be the EU. It is the most robust international organization out there, so inevitably hopes for multilateralism as a security solution look to the EU. And what a lost opportunity! Nothing would improve freedom and democracy in the world so much as a second liberal superpower. That would take the US face off of democracy promotion. It would help the US climb down from its extreme GWoT overextension. But the EU just cannot seem to get its act together, and the Greek flap is just an embarrassment. There is no integrated military command, no united nuclear command, no common foreign policy voice, no single UNSC seat. I would trust the Korean military to be more professional and committed at this point than any EU military but France and Britain. This is simply pathetic. The EU is becoming greater Switzerland, unable to act meaningful to defend the values it so regularly espouses.

2. Denuclearization/Disarmament. This strikes me as a chimaera. First, the nuclear-haves not meaningful moved toward denuclearization, despite a 40 year NPT commitment to do so. This is why proliferation is a problem to begin with; the nuclear-haves brought this on themselves by cheating on their NPT requirement. Obama may be trying to earn his Nobel Prize with serious denuclearization, I’ll believe it when I see it. Cuts to zero by the great powers would not eliminate the technology, but simply open them to blackmail; this flies in the face of so much of our experience about IR. Second, nukes, lasers, tanks, etc. are all just technologies. As the NRA likes to say, people kill, not guns. Consider nukes in Korea. No one would care if SK has them; everyone cares that NK has them. Unless everyone could be verifiably disarmed, this is wishful thinking.

3. League of Democracies. This has been my great hope the last few years, but it seems like this is fading now. I really thought a close friendship and working partnership among the liberal democracies could really help stability by making clear to rogues (and China) that there was a common front, that you can’t pick off democracies here and there and play them against each other. But this has failed. The democracies just do not seem to be able or willing to work together on security. The EU is a mess; Japan and Korea can’t talk to each other. Consider the piracy issue – tailor made for liberal democratic cooperation, but it hasn’t really happened, and that is an easy issue compared to tough ones like Taiwan or NK.

So, call me totally unimaginative, but below is the best I’ve got:

4. National power: the US . The US is the clear backstop for security since the Gulf War. This worked for awhile in the 1990s. The US budget was improving, and others were content to free-ride on the US. Simultaneously, American exceptionalism has always provided ‘last best hope for mankind’ narrative of US power that justifies and glorifies the US use of force to Americans. In other words, Americans were tempted by empire, while others were content to let them reach for it (because it was cheaper). This system, of great power quiescence and superpower exertion could continue, but it requires the great powers start paying for the US to be the policeman. The US is broke now – $9T debt and $1T budget deficit. You just can’t be the colossus when your population won’t pay for it. In the context of Korea, I often tell my Korean students that the US is so broke now, that in the next few years, Korea can either choose to pay for almost all of USFK, or the US will probably retrench, because the money just isn’t there anymore. The same applies more broadly; if you want to keep the US globocop (because you don’t want to go to Afghanistan yourself), then you will probably have to start paying it. QUICK PREDICTION: No will accept this, and the US will eventually retrench. That includes the hollowing out of NATO, as well as the US withdrawal from Korea.

5. Economics: Globalization. Thomas Barnett has influence my thinking a lot here. He regularly argues, like Friedman, that trade brings with it all sorts of pacifying effects. He doesn’t think a war with China is likely, because globalization is remaking China by connecting it with the world. So there is a race here, can the world globalize enough to build common interests in stability for trade, before the US hegemon, currently backstopping the order, runs out of cash and energy to keep doing it? This is a great master’s thesis waiting to be written.

If you noticed the paucity of good ideas, it is true. I don’t really have any. I think the world is becoming more and more complex, because of globalization and rising middle powers with a big prestige grudge toward the West. The Kantian-Europhilic vision of an international order that maintains peace through collective security is bogus. It is really premised on US power. Without the US, there would have been no UN involvement in Bosnia, the Gulf, Korea, etc. You can dress up US power in blue-helmets and euros, but ultimately, it is the US nation-state, not some collaborative/cooperative/mutual security organization that has done the organizational work and most of the fighting when it came to it. Given how much trouble the US has now (its deficit is the same size as its national security spending), I think retrenchment is coming. Such ‘multipolarity’ may feel more ‘just’ and less ‘imperialist’ to the risers, but it will almost certainly be more chaotic – as it already is if you compare the 1990s to the 2000.