The most basic lesson from Ukraine’s successes this year is that Russia is not going to win the war. That doesn’t mean that Ukraine will. The stalemate of the last 3.5 years is likely for another 3.5. But there is now pretty obviously no route to a Russian victory outside of escalation measures – like a national draft or the use of nuclear weapons – which are too risky.

That’s what I wrote this week for 1945 magazine. Here is the core of the argument:

The front is effectively frozen. Russia has not broken through in four years and has no new ideas to do so in the next four. The Ukrainian campaign to strike Russian fuel infrastructure and isolate Crimea is grinding away. Neither will bring a Russian collapse, but they are incrementally driving up the cost of continuing the war. As Phillips O’Brien has noted, these efforts are months underway, and Russia still has no counter strategy or feasible defense. Fuel shortages and rationing are spreading across Russia, and Putin’s ability to keep Crimea supplied is narrowing.
This may not win the conflict for Ukraine, but at this point, there is little doubt that Russia cannot win. Ukraine is turning into another of Russia’s frozen conflicts. But where most of those are contained and limited, this conflict is spreading across Russia by air and absorbing a staggering amount of resources which Moscow could use to modernize its economy to compete with the far wealthier countries it sees as its peer – the US, Europe, China – but behind whom it now badly lags.

Russia’s Options
The war has been stalemated for years and is now tilting slowly toward Ukraine. Putin could escalate. But mobilizing Russian society en masse would bring home the war to ethnic Russians in a way not felt yet. Putin has purposefully fought the war with non-Russian nationalities, foreigners, mercenaries, and so on to shield his ethnic Russian domestic political base from the war. Drafting that largely untouched middle class would generate a huge new army, but the political risk would be enormous, which is why Putin has demurred for years. It is also unclear if a huge new infantry force would really tilt the scales at this late date. The front is now extremely dangerous for infantry. Russian ‘meat attacks’ have not worked for years. It is unclear why or how they would after full-scale mobilization.
Similarly, Putin could escalate to nuclear weapons. But this carries enormous risks. China, India, and the US, who have all tilted toward Russia in the war, would pull back. Europe would strongly consider entering the war directly and would almost certainly dramatically increase aid to Ukraine. Unless nukes delivered a quick knock-out blow, the war would continue. The only way to deliver such a knock-out blow would be to strike a Ukrainian city with high-yield weapon. The global political blowback from that would be extreme.

I just can’t see Putin doing either of these options. Mass conscription would result in massive domestic discontent, and nukes would introduce huge new uncertainty. And neither option would likely work:

A huge new infantry force would be prey for Ukraine’s drones – as Russian infantry has been so far – if Putin did not use them differently than before. And there is nothing in the last year or two to suggest the Russians have any new infantry tactics. More ‘meat waves’ aren’t going to win the war.

And the nukes are too little, too late. The time to use them was in 2022, when the frontlines were fluid. Now, the Ukrainian army is dug in and spread in a long, thin line along the front. It is not concnetrated enough for one nuke to kill a huge number of Ukrainian soldiers. And using multiple nukes would scare the whole world, turning everyone against Putin.

So tell me how Putin wins this now? I genuinely do not see it.